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Evidence on the credibility of a central bank’s inflation target typically refers
to the anchoring of survey-based measures of inflation expectations. However,
both the survey question and the anchoring criteria are only loosely connected
to the actual inflation target used in monetary policy practice. By using the exact
wording of the ECB’s definition of price-stability, we started a representative on-
line survey of German citizens in January 2019 that is designed to measure the
time-varying credibility of the inflation target. Our results indicate that credibil-
ity has significantly decreased in our sample period, particularly in the course of
the coronavirus pandemic. Interestingly, even though inflation rates in Germany
have been clearly below 2% for several years, credibility has declined mainly be-
cause Germans increasingly expect that inflation will be much higher than 2%
over the medium term.
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of central banks have published quantitative definitions of price-
stability in order to improve the communication and accountability of monetary policy.
Since 2004, the European Central Bank (ECB) has repeatedly emphasized that in the pur-
suit of price stability it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium
term. This definition of price stability plays a central role in the communication strategy of
the ECB. Both, conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB have
always been explained to the public by the ultimate goal of steering too low inflation rates
in the Euro area back to the below, but close to, 2% level. Therefore, even in times of corona,
the credibility of the inflation target perceived by the public is of crucial importance.
Direct evidence on the credibility of inflation targets is surprisingly scant.1 The bulk of
the empirical literature evaluates a central bank’s credibility indirectly via the anchoring of
inflation expectations. Since a credible inflation target should anchor long-term inflation
expectations, the standard anchoring criterion is that inflation expectations should not re-
spond to economic news, forecast errors or shocks that are unrelated to the inflation target.
Following Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), it has been widely investigated whether and how ex-
pected inflation responds to surprises in macroeconomic news announcements.2 While this
literature provides important insights into the dynamics of inflation expectations, the an-
choring criteria are only loosely connected to the precise definition of price stability used
in monetary policy practice. For example, irrespective of their level, constant inflation ex-
pectations are always well-anchored under the news-criterion. As a result, the degree of
central bank credibility might be overestimated in times when inflation expectations are
persistently above or below the inflation target.
1Ehrmann et al. (2013), for example, analyze data of ECB trust taken from the Eurobarometer survey. Christelis
et al. (2020) employ survey data provided by the Dutch National Bank to explore the influence of trust in the
ECB on inflation expectations. For the United States, the Chicago Booth Expectations and Communications Sur-
vey suggests that almost 40% of the respondents believe that the Federal Reserve was targeting an inflation
rate of 10% or more, see Coibion et al. (2019).
2Bauer (2015) and Nautz et al. (2017) employ news-regressions to investigate the anchoring of inflation expec-
tations in the U.S. and the Euro area. Nautz et al. (2019) estimate the response of inflation expectations to
macroeconomic news shocks in a structural VAR model. Carvalho et al. (2019) propose a learning mecha-
nism to estimate the time-varying sensitivity of long-term inflation expectations to forecast errors. Another
strand of literature uses macro models of imperfect information to estimate the difference between the actual
inflation target and the target perceived by the public, see e.g. Diegel (2020) and the literature cited therein.
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A further issue of the indirect approach to central bank credibility concerns the interpre-
tation of survey-based measures of household inflation expectations. For instance, in the
tradition of the Michigan Consumer Survey, the widely-used Business and Consumer Sur-
vey of the European Commission asks households how they expect that consumer prices will
develop over the next 12 months. One of the answer categories is that prices will ”stay about
the same” which should imply that the expected inflation rate is zero and, thus, clearly be-
low the policy-intended level. However, for many consumers the mapping between prices
and inflation rates is not straightforward. In particular, respondents tend to react differ-
ently, depending on whether they are asked about expected changes in prices in general or
about expectations for the rate of inflation, see e.g. Arioli et al. (2017). Therefore, it is far
from obvious to what extent, for example, a high percentage of ”prices will stay about the
same”–answers actually indicates the low credibility of a non-zero inflation target.
In view of these problems, this paper introduces a representative online survey of Ger-
man citizens that is designed to measure the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target. Using
the exact wording of the ECB’s definition of price stability, we measure the credibility of the
inflation target directly and on a daily basis from January 2019 until May 2020. Our empiri-
cal results suggest that the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target has decreased significantly
during this period. The largest drop in credibility, observed in March 2020, could be related
to the economic disturbances stirred by the coronavirus pandemic. However, it is worth
emphasizing that even though inflation rates in Germany have been clearly below 2% for
several years, we find that the credibility of the inflation target has declined mainly because
Germans increasingly expect that inflation will be clearly above 2% over the medium term.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the online survey.
Section 3 defines the credibility indicator and investigates how the credibility of the inflation
target developed over time. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
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2 The Online Survey
2.1 Data
In order to collect data on the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target, we cooperate with
Civey, Germany’s largest company for online surveys. Civey surveys are spread out across
more than 25,000 partner websites including major German online-newspapers. The Civey
panel consists of approximately one million German citizens that signed up with their email-
address and created a user profile that provides further personal information about age, gen-
der, education, purchasing power, and the respondent’s postcode. Since the launch of our
credibility survey in January 2019, the total number of participants has increased steadily to
approximately 86,000 respondents in May 2020.
The statistical procedures to achieve representative results in online surveys are standard.
In particular, Civey exploits official socio-demographic data taken from the German statis-
tical office to accordingly weigh survey responses. Without weighting, for example, male
respondents aged above 50 and a high purchasing power would be clearly over-represented
in our sample. Online surveys can be answered on mobile devices which then improves the
participation from people working full-time and other households that are ”hard-to-reach”
by traditional surveys. For more technical details about the online survey methodology, see
Civey (2020).
Compared with traditional surveys that are conducted on a monthly or even quarterly ba-
sis, online surveys are easily implemented and can be evaluated at short notice and without
any delay. Therefore, online surveys could be of particular interest for a central bank mon-
itoring vigilantly how certain news or policy announcements have affected the credibility
of its inflation target. In line with the practice of traditional surveys, results of Civey online
surveys are based on at least 5000 observations. However, in order to fulfill that require-
ment, survey results may include responses given up to two months before. Accordingly, a
daily time series of survey results may underestimate short-run developments. Our empiri-
cal analysis of the time-varying credibility of the ECB’s inflation target is therefore based on
tests for breaks in the long-run average of the daily survey data.
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2.2 External Validity
In the monthly Business and Consumer Survey of the European Commission, a represen-
tative sample of European citizens including approximately 5000 Germans, is employed to
measure short-term inflation expectations of consumers. Since 2017, Civey has conducted a
corresponding online survey that adopts exactly the same wording:3
By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop over
the next 12 months? They will (PP) increase more rapidly; (P) increase at the same rate; (E) increase
at a slower rate; (M) stay about the same; (MM) fall; (N) don’t know.
The qualitative survey answers are typically summarized by the so-called expectations
balance defined as PP + 1/2P− MM− 1/2M, see e.g. Arioli et al. (2017). In order to assess
the external validity of our results, we compare the expectations balances obtained from the
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Figure 1 The Expectations Balance in Germany
Notes: Data provided by the Business and Consumer Survey of the European Commission and Civey.
Figure 1a shows the expectations balance observed at the publication date of the monthly survey. Daily
expectations balances from the online survey are shown in Figure 1b.
While expectations balances are always higher in the online survey, the two monthly time
series have been highly correlated since 2017, compare Figure 1a. Figure 1b shows that this
3The online survey can be accessed via https://widget.civey.com/4433. Arioli et al. (2017) provide a com-
prehensive analysis of the inflation expectations data provided by the Business and Consumer Survey of the
European Commission.
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is also true for daily expectations data from January 2019 onward. This strongly suggests
that the reliability of the expectations data from the online survey is very high.
3 The Time-Varying Credibility of the ECB’s Inflation Target
3.1 A Survey-Based Credibility Indicator
Surveys on household inflation expectations are often not designed to assess the credibility
of a central bank’s inflation target. To the best of our knowledge, our survey is the first one
yet to use the exact wording of the ECB’s definition of price stability and therefore allows
a direct way of measuring the credibility of the inflation target. That being said, Civey
launched the following survey question in January 2019.4
• In what range do you think the annual inflation rate will be over the medium term?
It will be . . .
(A) . . . clearly above 2%
(B) . . . slightly above 2%
(C) . . . below, but close to 2%
(D) . . . clearly below 2%
(N) Do not know
The answers C and, to a much lesser degree, B are compatible with a credible inflation
target. Therefore, we propose to summarize the degree of credibility by the indicator vari-
able CI = C + 12 B. Note that CI = 1 (CI = 0) indicates full (zero) credibility of the inflation
target. Similar to the expectations balances that are widely used to evaluate qualitative in-
flation expectations data (see e.g. Arioli et al. (2017)), the weighting scheme of the credibility
indicator is adhoc and debatable. We also experimented with alternative indicators, partly
with negative weights on answers A, D, and/or N. It is worth emphasizing that our main
results do not depend on that choice.5
4The actual survey question is stated in German and applies to the official translation used by the ECB and the
Bundesbank, i.e. unter aber nahe bei 2% in der mittleren Frist, see https://widget.civey.com/4417.
5For brevity, the results for alternative credibility indicators are not presented here but are available on request.
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Notes: The Figure shows the daily development of the credibility indicator CI = C + 12 B. The vertical lines
refer to the credibility regimes identified by multiple endogenous break tests. The horizontal lines show
the corresponding mean value of the indicator. For more information, see Table 1.
3.2 Empirical Results
The data obtained for the credibility indicator CI are shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 indicates
that the credibility of the ECB’s inflation target slightly decreased throughout 2019 followed
by a sudden decline in March 2020. This first impression can be supported by the results of
multiple endogenous break point tests, see Table 1. According to these tests, the mean of the
credibility indicator has decreased three times in our sample period. While the mean of CI
fluctuated around 45.67 in the first half of 2019, it decreased in two small steps up to 42.90
during the first quarter of 2020. The reduction in credibility is more distinct in the most
recent regime where the indicator CI reached its minimum and its mean has fallen to 34.06.
The survey data provides further insights into the drivers of the observed credibility de-
cline. Table 1 presents the mean proportions of all 5 answer categories. Interestingly, the four
credibility regimes identified by the break point tests do not only differ in the mean of the
credibility indicator. Compared with the first regime, the credibility indicator has decreased
in the second half of 2019 because both low-credibility categories, A and D, have increased.
Therefore, even though inflation rates in Germany have been clearly below 2% for several
years, the credibility indicator has declined partly because more people expected inflation
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Table 1 Survey Results
Credibility Regime
A B C D N CI
>> 2% > 2% < 2% << 2%
05.02.2019-20.06.2019 16.49 34.43 28.45 7.03 13.59 45.67
21.06.2019-28.12.2019 17.60 32.85 27.76 8.64 13.15 44.18
29.12.2019-20.03.2020 17.64 31.51 27.14 10.14 13.57 42.90
21.03.2020-31.05.2020 27.85 29.70 19.22 7.91 15.33 34.06
Notes: The Table shows the mean values of the various survey responses in the credibility regimes identified
by the global testing procedure for multiple endogenous breaks introduced by Bai and Perron (1998). The
procedure allows for heterogeneous error distributions and applies HAC standard errors. We trim 15% of
the observations at the boundaries of each regime. A: Clearly above 2%, B: Above, but close to, 2%, C:
Below, but close to, 2%, D: Clearly below 2%, N: Don’t know, CI = C + 0.5B: Credibility Indicator
to be clearly above 2% over the medium term. By contrast, in the third regime, covering the first
quarter of 2020, the proportion of A answers in the survey responses has remained stable
and the further loss of credibility of the inflation target is mainly driven by a higher propor-
tion of survey respondents that expect inflation to be clearly below 2% over the medium term.
This trend, however, is reversed in the most recent regime that is presumably triggered by
the coronavirus pandemic. Here, the significant decline of the credibility indicator is partly
due to higher uncertainty (N) but predominantly driven by the higher proportion of people
expecting inflation rates clearly above 2%.
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4 Concluding Remarks
The current paper employs a novel data set taken from a representative online-survey of
German citizens to investigate the time-varying credibility of the ECB’s inflation target.
Our results show that credibility has significantly declined during 2019 and, particularly,
in March 2020 probably in response to the massive fiscal and monetary policy interventions
implied by the coronavirus pandemic. Remarkably, even though inflation rates in Germany
have been clearly below 2% for several years, the survey suggests that credibility of the ECB’s
inflation target has declined mainly because more people expect inflation rates to be clearly
above 2% over the medium term.
In accordance with Coibion et al. (2020), a lack of credibility of the inflation target could
be particularly problematic in times of unconventional monetary policies that are thought to
operate primarily through the inflation expectations of households and firms. In fact, there
has been an increased interest in the analysis of household expectations and several new,
though standard, consumer surveys like the Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)
or the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) have been launched. Our
results suggest that online surveys could be an additional tool for monetary policy analysis
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